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FOSTERING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: A 
HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 
MATTHEW F. DOERINGER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Several states in the United States are attempting to nurture the growth 
of social enterprise by adopting statutes which enable the registration of 
Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies (“L3Cs”). The L3C is the first 
American legal form to embrace and facilitate social enterprise. However, 
Belgium and the United Kingdom created legal forms to achieve similar 
ends many years prior to the creation of the L3C. The Belgian and U.K. 
experiences with these legal forms as well as the historical treatment of 
social enterprise in the United States provide lessons for how the United 
States should regulate the L3C and social enterprise in general. 
This paper tracks the development of social enterprise in the United 
States and Europe and ultimately proposes that effective government 
policies need to stimulate capital investment in social enterprise and 
generate greater public understanding of the sector’s potential benefits. Part 
I discusses the history and development of social enterprise as a concept 
and as a sector of the economy in the United States and Europe. Part II 
discusses the difficulties of adapting the nonprofit and the for-profit 
corporate forms to entities operating as social enterprises in the United 
States. Part III discusses social enterprise in Europe and how the 
governments in Belgium and the United Kingdom have attempted to 
stimulate growth of social enterprise by creating new business entities 
which bridge the gap between nonprofit and for-profit forms. Part IV 
discusses the recent government effort to aid social enterprise in the United 
States through the creation of the L3C and the difficulties which have 
slowed the impact of the L3C. Part V discusses lessons from the 
experiences in Belgium and the United Kingdom which can help guide 
social-enterprise policy in the United States. 
 
 * Candidate for the degree of J.D., Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank 
Professors Richard Schmalbeck and Andrew Foster and my classmates in The Law of Social 
Enterprises for their insight and guidance throughout the development of this note. 
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I. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
In this section I discuss how the concept of social enterprise has 
developed in the United States and in Europe. Both regions have different 
definitions of social enterprise, in part because the general ideas about 
social enterprise in the United States and Europe reflect the unique 
responses to different economic difficulties the regions faced in the past. 
The definition in the United States generally reflects a focus on generating 
income for organizations that provide services typically thought of as being 
provided by the nonprofit sector, such as an organization which offers free 
eye exams while selling low-cost eyeglasses to low-income populations. In 
contrast, the concept of social enterprise in Europe has evolved generally to 
focus on resolving problems of chronic structural unemployment. 
Social enterprise as a concept is gaining momentum in business 
schools across the United States1 and is an increasingly valuable sector in 
the global economy.2 However, as the concept gains support, its definition 
continues to expand. One of the major obstacles to the discussion and study 
of the topic is the lack of a clear and concise definition. In fact, a review of 
recent scholarly publications yields a crop of over twenty unique 
definitions of social enterprise,3 not to mention a glut of Venn diagrams 
attempting to clarify the idea.4 
Because of the expansive number of definitions of social enterprise, a 
simple but broad understanding of the term can be helpful when looking at 
social enterprise across a wide spectrum. The simplest of definitions 
follows from the individual definitions of “social” and “enterprise.” 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER defines “social” as “of or relating to human 
society . . . the interaction of the individual and the group . . . [or] the 
welfare of human beings as members of society,”5 and “enterprise” as “a 
unit of economic organization or activity . . . [especially]: a business 
organization.”6 Combining these terms leads to an understanding of social 
enterprise as any business organization which takes into account human 
society or the welfare of human beings. This definition is vague, but it 
encompasses many of the broad concepts which have gathered under the 
 
 1. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1 (2008). 
 2. See id. at vii-viii; Jacques Defourney, Introduction: From Third Sector to Social Enterprise, in 
THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 1-28 (Carlo Borzaga & Jacques Defourny eds., 2001). 
 3. LIGHT, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4. See infra Appendix. 
 5. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2161 (1993). 
 6. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 757 (1993). 
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umbrella of social enterprise. I will use this definition as a starting point 
from which to form a more concrete understanding of the concept. 
This broad definition includes entities or organizations which operate 
in the commercial sector, but have, at their core, interests which are 
traditionally associated with the nonprofit sector. One of the best known 
social enterprises in the United States, Goodwill Industries, has existed 
since 1902.7 Edgar J. Helms, a Methodist minister, started the organization 
in Boston, Massachusetts to collect goods donated from the wealthy and to 
hire poorer city residents to repair and sell the goods.8 It was a means to 
fund his community programs and provide job training for people in 
disadvantaged communities.9 Similar organizations existed on a smaller 
scale in the United States throughout the early- and mid-twentieth 
century.10 
These types of businesses became more prominent in the United 
States during the late 1970s and 1980s in response to the economic 
downturn and major cutbacks in government spending. These 
developments caused many charities to lose funding while facing increased 
needs due to the dramatic rise in unemployment.11 Many charities at this 
time felt the need to increase their revenue from sources other than grants 
and donations. Several of these charities began to rely increasingly on 
commercial activities for revenue, greatly expanding this type of American 
social enterprise. As a result, the portion of income that charities received 
from commercial activity increased by 20% between 1982 and 2002.12 
Social enterprises in Europe also gained prominence during the 
economic downturn in the 1970s, but for slightly different reasons. As was 
the case in the United States, several European countries experienced 
 
 7. Goodwill Industries, Our History, http://www.goodwill.org/page/guest/about/whatwedo/ 
ourhistory (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Provident Living, Deseret Industries, http://www.providentliving.org/content/list/ 
0,11664,2022-1,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009); R.W. Dellinger, St. Vincent de Paul Thrift Store 
Has History of Helping, TIDINGS ONLINE, June 22, 2007, http://www.the-tidings.com/2007/ 
062207/vincent3.htm. 
 11. Janelle A. Kerlin, Social Enterprise in the United States and Europe: Understanding and 
Learning from the Differences, 17 VOLUNTAS 247, 251 (2006). See also Michael A. Urquhart & 
Marillyn A. Hewson, Unemployment Continued to Rise in 1982 as Recession Deepened, 106 MONTHLY 
LAB. REV. 3, Feb. 1983, at 3 (discussing the high unemployment rates of the early 1980s). 
 12. These figures are based on a 2002 study of nonprofits with annual revenue of over $25,000. 
Commercial activity, defined as income from special events, sales of goods, and dues and payments 
where members received comparable benefits, grew as percentage of income for these groups from 
48.1% in 1982 to 57.6% in 2002. Kerlin, supra note 11, at 252. 
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drastic increases in unemployment, with many countries surpassing 10% 
unemployment.13 However, unlike in the United States, where only 12% of 
the unemployed were considered “long-term unemployed” (unemployed 
for more than a year), 40% of Europe’s unemployed fell in this category.14 
The downturn significantly cut government budgets across the continent, 
reducing states’ ability to provide unemployment assistance and job re-
integration, further compounding the unemployment problem.15 In response 
to the void left by the reduction in government services, several charities 
chose to focus their efforts on battling structural unemployment.16 Many 
charities started job-training and work-integration programs—programs 
which often had commercial, or social-enterprise, characteristics.17 
The European charities’ focus on unemployment marked a distinct 
shift from earlier ideas of charity as being limited to advocacy and the 
provision of services for the poor.18 Because this new focus often included 
commercial activities, it decisively shaped the understanding of social 
enterprise in Europe and in turn guided the development of social-
enterprise policy across the continent. 19 However, despite this common 
focus and a developed history of social-enterprise legislation, discussion of 
social enterprise in Europe remains difficult due to the lack of a unified 
definition of the concept. Several European countries have adopted their 
own official definitions,20 but the European Union (“EU”) has yet to 
 
 13. TACKLING SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN EUROPE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOCIAL ECONOMY 5 
(Roger Spear et al. eds., 2001). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Defourny, supra note 2. 
 16. Kerlin, supra note 11, at 252-53. 
 17. Defourny, supra note 2. 
 18. Jacques Defourny, Towards a European Conceptualization of the Third Sector, in IMAGES 
AND CONCEPTS OF THE THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE 3 (Jacques Defourny et al. eds., 2008). 
 19. See id., at 12; Kerlin, supra note 11, at 250. 
 20. The United Kingdom, Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland have official definitions of 
social enterprise. KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME RESEARCH, STUDY ON 
PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN EUROPE 11 (2007) [hereinafter KMU 
FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA]. The official definition in the United Kingdom is, “a business with primarily 
social objectives whose surpluses are principally re-invested for that purpose in the business or in the 
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners.” 
KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME RESEARCH, STUDY ON PRACTICES AND 
POLICIES IN THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN EUROPE: COUNTRY FICHE – UNITED KINGDOM 2 
(2007).The official definition in Belgium is enterprises that “produce goods and services [that] answer a 
certain need and target a population of costumers [sic]. . . . [and the goods] are made available on the 
market for a certain price. Social economy initiatives and social enterprises strive towards continuity, 
profitability and sustainable development.” KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR 
SME RESEARCH, STUDY ON PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN EUROPE: 
COUNTRY FICHE – BELGIUM 2 (2007) [hereinafter COUNTRY FICHE – BELGIUM].The official definition 
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recognize a single overarching definition. The lack of a common or unified 
understanding hinders trans-national statistical comparisons and makes it 
difficult to monitor best practices or successful regulatory frameworks 
across countries.21 
II. PROBLEMS OF ADAPTING TRADITIONAL U.S. LEGAL FORMS 
TO SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
Until recently, social enterprises in the United States were stuck firmly 
between the choice of forming as for-profit entities with some social 
objectives or as nonprofit entities with some commercial objectives. These 
traditional forms are each designed for either end of the economic 
spectrum: nonprofit and for-profit. Social enterprises typically have 
characteristics of both, yet neither traditional form offers much room for 
hybrid activity. In the past few years new hybrid options have became 
available, including the L3C. In order to understand the potential economic 
and social impacts of these new hybrids, it is important to recognize the 
advantages and limitations of the traditional options. In this section I 
discuss the difficulties of using the traditional nonprofit and for-profit 
forms for social-enterprise organizations in the United States.  
A. The Nonprofit Corporation 
Tax incentives and the nature of the work done by social enterprises 
drive many social entrepreneurs to form their enterprises as nonprofit 
 
in Latvia is, “associations and foundations that in their statutes have given their objectives of operating 
to create social benefit, as well as religious organisation or institutions which also have social 
objectives, if these associations, foundations, and religious organisations have been given the status of 
social enterprise and if they do not distribute their physical and financial assets directly or indirectly 
among the establishers, representatives of board of administration, or members of other administrating 
institutions.” KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME RESEARCH, STUDY ON 
PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN EUROPE: COUNTRY FICHE – LATVIA 2 
(2007). The official definition in Lithuania is, “an independent small or medium-sized enterprise . . . 
[where] the employees classified as target groups account for at least 40% [of the workforce] and there 
are at least 4 such employees . . . ; [where] the enterprise is engaged in the development of employees’ 
working and social skills and social integration; [and] the enterprise’s income from activities [are] not 
eligible for support account for not more than 20%.” KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, AUSTRIAN 
INSTITUTE FOR SME RESEARCH, STUDY ON PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
SECTOR IN EUROPE: COUNTRY FICHE – LITHUANIA 2 (2007). The official definition in Finland is, “a 
company . . . producing goods and services on commercial principles and whose purpose is to make 
profits. . . . The special feature of a social enterprise is that at least 30% of its employees are 
disadvantaged in the labour market and long-term unemployed.” KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, 
AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME RESEARCH, STUDY ON PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN THE SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN EUROPE: COUNTRY FICHE – FINLAND 2 (2007). 
 21. See KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, supra note 20, at 4. 
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corporations. However, the business characteristics of these organizations 
can create obstacles to receiving the full benefits of the nonprofit form. 
Some of these problems stem from ambiguous and often conflicting ideas 
as to the nature, purpose, and boundaries of charity. 
Initial conceptions of charity in the United States grew from an idea of 
community self-help in the absence of aid from the government. To a 
certain extent this reflects how communities initially developed. As settlers 
came over from Europe, “New World” communities were established 
before the inception of any strong government. Often, public needs, such as 
caring for the poor, had to be handled by members of the community if 
they were to be handled at all.22 This idea of community self-help helped 
initially shape the charitable sector, as the sector developed in the United 
States largely without influence from the government. 
Before the creation of the federal income tax in 1913 and the 
accompanying federal definition of “charity,” individual states defined 
“charity.” However, even within each state, creating a uniform definition 
proved to be a difficult task. This dilemma is evident in Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court rulings from the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
court had difficulty determining whether charity was rooted in the 
intentions of the donor or in the ultimate use of the donations. In 1857 the 
court took the position that intent was relevant, holding that “‘whatever is 
given for the love of God, or for the love of your neighbor, in the catholic 
and universal sense . . . free from the stain or taint of every consideration 
that is personal, private, or selfish,’ is a gift of charitable uses.”23 The court 
later retreated from this idea in 1888, when it stated that “[i]t would be as 
vain as it would be unprofitable for a human tribunal to speculate upon the 
motives of men in such cases . . . . The money which is selfishly given to 
public charity does as much good as that which is contributed from a higher 
motive, and in a legal sense the donor must have equal credit therefor.”24 
This second, more objective, test ultimately proved to be more practical in 
determining what qualifies as a charitable contribution, rather than relying 
on the moral undertones of the court’s first test. However, moral elements 
are still evident in today’s laws relating to what constitutes a charity. 
The most defining characteristics of public charities in the United 
States is exemption from federal income taxes and the ability to receive 
 
 22. Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled 
Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2451 (2005). 
 23. Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23, 35 (Pa. 1857) (quoting Attorney Binney’s argument in Vidal v. 
The City of Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127 (1844)). 
 24. Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 15 Atl. 553, 554-55 (Pa. 1888). 
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tax-deductible donations. Because of these common traits, the federal 
government’s definition of charity prevails over other definitions. The 
exemption from federal income tax is as old as the income tax itself. The 
Tariff Act of 1894 provided the first glimpse of tax-exempt status when it 
said “nothing herein contained shall apply to . . . corporations, companies, 
or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or 
educational purposes.”25 The Tariff Act was later deemed 
unconstitutional,26 but following the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
the succeeding Revenue Act of 1913 also granted a tax exemption to “any 
corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”27 This benefit was 
significantly enhanced in 1917 when Congress introduced a tax deduction 
available to donors for their donations to these statutorily-defined nonprofit 
organizations.28 
Nevertheless, the creation of a federal standard of charity did not 
eliminate the difficulty of determining which organizations should be 
considered charities. This is often not a problem, as many charities, like 
soup kitchens and homeless shelters, clearly operate in the nonprofit arena; 
however, when nonprofits direct some of their operations in the 
commercial arena, such as through the sale of goods or the provision of 
moving services,29 the task becomes more difficult. Social enterprises that 
want to operate as nonprofits and avail themselves of the associated 
benefits, but also want to pursue commercial activities, must navigate the 
various tests and regulations devised by Congress and the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury in order to ensure that they can maintain their tax-exempt 
status. 
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) sets out the basic criteria for 
tax-exempt status in Section 501(c)(3) of the tax code. The criteria can be 
understood as having five main parts: the organization must be (1) a 
“Corporation[], . . . community chest, fund, or foundation,” (2) “organized 
and” (3) “operated exclusively for [one of the purposes identified by the 
 
 25. Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894), invalidated by Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan 
& Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 26. Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 27. Underwood Tariff Act, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913) (amended 1993). 
 28. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). 
 29. See, e.g., TROSA, Trosa Businesses, http://www.trosainc.org/businesses/index.htm (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
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IRS, hereinafter referred to generally as an “exempt purpose”],”30 (4) “no 
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual,” and (5) “no substantial part of the activities of 
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation . . . [or] intervene in . . . any political campaign.”31 The most 
relevant portions of this five-part test to social enterprise are parts three and 
four: that the nonprofit must be operated exclusively for an exempt 
purpose, and that there can be no private inurement. 
The meaning of “operated exclusively” for determining whether an 
organization can receive a tax exemption is not as clear as it first appears. 
At first glance, it appears that the tax code disallows tax-exempt status to 
nonprofits that engage in any trade or business activity that is not wholly 
directed towards fulfilling an exempt purpose. However, the regulations 
specify that the “exclusively test” is not as stringent as it sounds, detailing 
that “[a]n organization will be regarded as ‘operated exclusively’ . . . if it 
engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more exempt 
purposes.”32 This clarifies that the exclusively requirement can in fact be 
met by the less exacting requirement of primarily operating for an exempt 
purpose. Furthermore, even if the trade or business is a substantial part of 
the organization’s activities, the exclusively test can be satisfied if the 
activity “is in furtherance of the organization’s exempt purpose.”33 
Therefore, insubstantial commercial activity is allowed so long as it does 
not stand in the way of the organization primarily operating for an exempt 
purpose, and substantial activity is allowed as long as it furthers the 
organization’s exempt purpose. These regulations make it clear that there is 
some room for entrepreneurial and commercial activity while remaining a 
nonprofit, but it is unclear where the boundaries are. This lack of defined 
boundaries causes the determination to fall to the courts, and social 
entrepreneurs are left to guess how courts will rule in their specific 
situations. 
Judicial attempts to define what activity is “substantial” do not offer 
any certainty to social enterprises attempting to operate as nonprofits. In an 
attempt to clarify what activity is deemed substantial, courts have 
 
 30. The IRS defines “exempt purpose” as “religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public 
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition 
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2007). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2009). 
 33. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2009). 
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developed the “commerciality doctrine.” This doctrine essentially asks 
whether the business activity in question has a distinctive “commercial 
hue.”34 The development of this concept, however, has not added a 
substantial amount of clarity to the issue. Courts have stated that large 
profits alone are insufficient to prove that a nonprofit’s business activity 
has become activity of a commercial hue.35 However, courts have also 
indicated that sizable profits can be evidence of activity “of a commercial 
character.”36 This difficulty is compounded by unclear, if not inconsistent, 
application of the doctrine by the IRS and the courts. In 1979, the IRS sued 
a nonprofit, which operated a pharmacy that generally sold discounted 
drugs to senior citizens.37 Although only 2% of the pharmacy’s sales were 
made to the public at retail prices, the Tax Court held that the pharmacy 
was too commercial in character and revoked its tax-exempt status.38 One 
year later, in 1980, the IRS issued a Private Letter Ruling (“PLR”) 
informing a nonprofit, which operated a prosthetic center for injured 
veterans, and which generated 47% of its revenue from the general public, 
that the nonprofit’s commercial activities did not jeopardize its tax-exempt 
status.39 The commerciality doctrine does not let social enterprises 
operating as nonprofits easily predict whether their tax-exempt status is in 
jeopardy when conducting business activity that does not further their 
exempt purpose, but which may qualify as insubstantial activity. 
When social-enterprise nonprofits operate a substantial amount of 
commercial activity, they need to qualify this activity as activity which 
furthers their exempt purposes in order to not risk losing their tax-exempt 
status.40 It is important to note, however, that operating commercial activity 
simply to fund an exempt purpose will not qualify as furthering the exempt 
purpose.41 Instead, the commercial activity must itself further the exempt 
purpose. A clear example is Goodwill Industries, where the sales of 
donated goods not only raise funds, but also offer opportunities for job 
training for members of disadvantaged communities.42 
 
 34. See Airlie Found. v. I.R.S., 283 F. Supp. 2d 58, 65 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 35. See Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 803 (1961). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Fed’n Pharm. Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 687 (1979). 
 38. Id. 
 39. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-38-004 (May 28, 1980). 
 40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2009). 
 41. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 42. See Goodwill Industries, supra note 7. 
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Satisfying the “operated exclusively” test under one of these two 
prongs is necessary for nonprofits to gain some of the benefits of tax-
exempt status. However, even with tax-exempt status, nonprofits are not 
wholly exempt from income-tax responsibilities. Nonprofits are still 
responsible for paying taxes on income derived from an “unrelated trade or 
business.”43 While some amount of commercial activity may not strip the 
nonprofit of its tax-exempt status, if the activity is not substantially related 
to the exempt purpose, then income tax will be due on that portion of 
income, and the tax exemption will be worth far less to the enterprise. 
Because the unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”) can limit the 
value of a nonprofit’s tax exemption, it often serves as a significant 
restriction on the nonprofit’s activities. In order to appreciate these 
limitations, it is important to understand the UBIT’s development. Before 
1950, the UBIT did not exist and tax-exempt nonprofits could earn tax-free 
income from any commercial activity that they operated, so long as they 
maintained their tax-exempt status. Needless to say, this prompted some 
nonprofits to engage in business activity entirely unrelated to their exempt 
purposes simply to raise funds. An alumni group from the New York 
University School of Law gained national attention when it purchased the 
C.F. Mueller Company, a highly successful pasta manufacturer, solely to 
direct its profits to the law school.44 This purchase raised the ire of the 
business community which clamored that this offered an unfair competitive 
advantage to companies owned by nonprofits over other commercial 
enterprises that have to pay corporate income tax on their profits. Shortly 
after the C.F. Mueller purchase, Congress responded to the complaints of 
the business community. In 1950, Representative John Dingell went so far 
as to report to the House of Representatives that “eventually all the noodles 
produced in this country will be produced by corporations held or created 
by universities.”45 Later that year Congress passed the Revenue Act of 
1950, imposing, for the first time, federal income tax on unrelated business 
income (“UBI”).46 
Social-enterprise nonprofits that want to raise tax-exempt funds 
through commercial activities need to be careful that the income is not 
categorized as UBI. The Treasury attempts to clarify what activity 
generates UBI by outlining a three-part test in the regulations. UBI will 
 
 43. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2007). 
 44. See C.F. Mueller Co., 190 F.2d at 120. 
 45. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 579-80 (1950) (statement 
of Rep. Dingell, Member, House Comm. on Ways and Means). 
 46. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 301, 64 Stat. 906, 947 (1950). 
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arise from activity that is (1) “a trade or business,” (2) “regularly carried 
on,” and (3) that “is not substantially related” to the nonprofit’s exempt 
purpose.47 The IRS adds that any income derived from conduct “not 
substantially related” to the “exercise or performance” of the organization’s 
exempt purpose will qualify as UBI.48 The regulations explicitly clarify that 
solely using profits to fund an exempt activity will not meet the level of 
substantially related conduct, and that there must be a “causal connection” 
between the business activity and the exempt purpose.49 
These various tests and definitions still leave significant ambiguity for 
social-enterprise nonprofits. For example, how strong does the casual 
connection need to be? Would the sale of recycled goods by a nonprofit 
focused on increasing access to recycling programs count? What about at-
cost sales of art supplies in disadvantaged communities? The case 
involving the nonprofit prosthetic center operated to aid disabled veterans 
discussed above offers some clarity.50 The IRS concluded that all income 
derived from sales and services provided for veterans would not be UBI, 
but that all income derived from sales to the general public would qualify 
as UBI (though it would not rob the organization of its tax-exemption).51 
For social enterprises that have difficulty delineating which services are 
offered to the general public and which services further their exempt 
purpose, these rules create a large possibility of having to pay income taxes 
on income which is not clearly in line with their exempt purpose. 
Moreover, the “operated exclusively” test and the UBIT pose serious 
impediments to financing charity through activities that have commercial 
qualities. Generally, it appears that the tax code pushes nonprofits to 
operate in a manner similar to traditional charities, operating primarily off 
of grants and donations. However, many scholars believe that the message 
from Congress and the public to charities is to operate more like a business, 
with a careful eye on efficiency and sustainability.52 The confusion in this 
area raises the question of whether it is in the best interests of society to 
prevent charities from embracing the full potential of commercial activity. 
Some scholars argue that nonprofits should be encouraged to 
participate in the market economy as a means to enhance their efficiency 
 
 47. Treas. Reg. 1.513-1(a) (2009). 
 48. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2007). 
 49. Treas. Reg. 1.513-1(d) (2009). 
 50. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 51. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 803-80-04 (May 28, 1980). 
 52. Kelley, supra note 22, at 2437-38. 
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and increase their overall impact.53 On the macro level, empirical evidence 
suggests that nonprofits tend to react slower to changes in the demand for 
the services they offer when compared to for-profit organizations.54 The 
roots of the efficiency-disparity can be seen in two areas. First, the 
restriction in the tax code denying nonprofits a tax exemption if they 
generate any private inurement bars nonprofits from using incentive-based 
pay schemes to compensate their employees.55 This type of compensation 
structure could help incentivize managers of nonprofits to minimize 
administrative costs56—costs which have grown to the point where the 
average charity spends close to 18% of its income on fundraising and 
overhead costs.57 Compared to the average cost of raising funds to start a 
small business, typically 2% to 5% of funds raised, and average sales and 
marketing costs of consumer-oriented companies, typically about 10% of 
income, the 18% figure for charity overhead costs suggests that some 
structural inefficiencies exist.58 
In addition, the allocation of funds to, and within, charities is often not 
correlated with the charity’s success. One study confirming this 
observation compared the per-client costs of over 300 local affiliates of 
three large, nationally organized nonprofit youth organizations. The study 
found that some affiliates spent significantly more per client to achieve 
comparable results of other affiliates, yet resources were not in turn 
diverted to the cost-effective affiliates.59 Furthermore, foundation grants 
tend to favor new and innovative, but potentially inefficient and costly 
projects, rather than tested, reliable, and efficient programs.60 This systemic 
 
 53. See Bill Drayton, The Citizen Sector Transformed, in SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: NEW 
MODELS OF SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL CHANGE 45 (Alex Nichols ed., 2006); Anup Malani & Eric A. 
Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017-66 (2007). 
 54. J. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, 2 INT’L. J. OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP EDUC. (SPECIAL ISSUE: SOC. ENTREPRENEURSHIP) 6 (2004). 
 55. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2007). 
 56. Malani & Posner, supra note 53, at 2027. 
 57. What We Know about Overhead Costs in the Nonprofit Sector, NONPROFIT OVERHEAD COST 
PROJECT (Ctr. on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, Urban Inst. Ctr. on Philanthropy, Ind. Univ.), Feb. 2004, 
at 1. In some extreme cases this figure can rise to over 90%. See United Cancer Council, Inc., v. 
Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1999) (where a nonprofit organization spent $26.5 million to 
raise $28.8 million). 
 58. Bill Bradley, Paul Jansen & Les Silverman, The Nonprofit Sector’s $100 Billion Opportunity, 
HARV. BUS. REV. May 2003, at 94, 97. 
 59. Local agencies in the 25th percentile spent 67% more per client than those in the 75th 
percentile. Id. at 100. 
 60. See Christine W. Letts, William Ryan & Allen Grossman, Virtuous Capital: What 
Foundations Can Learn from Venture Capitalists, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 36, 37. 
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lack of accountability along with the incentives to develop new programs 
can lead charities to develop inefficient practices and focus on developing 
ideas for the future rather than reviewing past successes.61 A 2003 study 
estimated that such inefficiencies cost nonprofits roughly $100 billion 
annually.62 
Bill Drayton, founder of Ashoka, one of the largest foundations 
exclusively funding social enterprises, points out that from the time of 
Ancient Rome until 1700, there was essentially zero per capita income 
growth in western countries, but at the turn of the eighteenth century 
businesses began operating in a more modern, competitive fashion which 
resulted in per capita income growth of 20%, 200%, and 740%, 
respectively, over the following three centuries.63 However, during this 
period of expansive business growth, charities developed along an entirely 
different path, with their own legal forms and methods of operation. 
Drayton argues that this split was a “historical accident, a giant 
navigational error,” and that “the inertia of [the initial] division remains 
strong,” holding back the growth of modern charities.64 The apparent lack 
of efficiency in today’s charitable organizations seems to be in line with 
Drayton’s argument. 
B. For-Profit Entities 
In light of the difficulties and obstacles inherent in operating a social 
enterprise as a nonprofit entity, some social entrepreneurs prefer to operate 
as a free-standing for-profit entity, or create a for-profit entity that 
contributes its profits to a corresponding nonprofit. However, these options 
have their own set of difficulties. 
The main obstacle to operating a social enterprise as a for-profit entity 
is the difficulty of raising capital. 65 Choosing to operate a business with a 
social purpose often involves making choices that can lower the potential to 
generate economic profits. As a result of this diminished profit-potential, 
the interest rates associated with raising capital through debt markets can 
be prohibitively high. 
Problems also arise when attempting to access equity markets. Once a 
company issues shares, its board and its officers are obligated to look after 
 
 61. Id. at 37. 
 62. Bradley, Jansen & Silverman, supra note 58, at 102. 
 63. Drayton, supra note 53, at 46. 
 64. Id. at 51. 
 65. See Matrix Group Discussion Paper, Finance for Foundations: Expanding the Toolbox for 
Impact (UBS Philanthropy Servs., Discussion Paper No. 2007-06-05). 
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the interests of the shareholders over all other constituencies. This 
shareholder primacy model dates back to 1918, when Henry Ford made the 
mistake of declaring that his ambition was “to employ still more men; to 
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, 
to help them build up their lives and their homes,” instead of delivering 
increased profits back to the shareholders.66 A court order required the Ford 
Company to issue a special dividend rather than reinvest the money as 
Henry Ford wanted.67 Henry Ford’s mistake flowed from stating that he 
wanted to direct the business’s resources to help outside constituencies, 
instead of reinvesting with an eye toward greater future profits or creating 
returns for the shareholders. Although courts have yet to require another 
company to issue special dividends, there still remains the risk of 
shareholder derivative suits if profits are not reinvested to create economic 
gains or distributed to the shareholders.68 
Consequently, the social enterprise’s interest in reinvesting profits 
toward social purposes could easily be viewed as conflicting with the 
shareholders’ interest of increasing the economic return on their shares. 
This suggests a significant potential for derivative suit litigation. 
Furthermore, directors of the company who are elected by the company’s 
shareholders may find themselves favoring the economic interests of the 
shareholders over the social interests for which the enterprise was 
established. 
Social enterprises set up as public for-profit corporations that donate 
profits to corresponding charities face additional obstacles when attempting 
to donate large percentages of their profits. The IRS allows corporations to 
deduct charitable donations of up to 10% of their profits.69 However, if 
more than 10% of profits are given to charity, the donated profits above 
this level are taxed at the corporate income tax rate. State laws governing 
corporate law do not restrict donations to this level, but the laws are 
generally interpreted to authorize only reasonable levels of giving.70 
Furthermore, courts have used the 10% level from the tax code as a 
“helpful guide” to determine if a charitable gift amounts to actionable 
corporate waste.71 It appears that in most situations, for-profit public 
 
 66. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919). 
 67. See id. at 685. 
 68. I address the issue of explicitly including the interests of outside constituencies in corporate 
documents later in this note. See infra text accompanying notes 74-81. 
 69. This level is subject to carry-back provisions, etc. I.R.C. § 170(2)(A) (2007). 
 70. See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
 71. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991). 
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corporations donating more than 10% of their profits to a nonprofit would 
be opening up themselves to liability from a derivative suit, essentially 
foreclosing this scheme as a viable option for social enterprises. 
Therefore, when a social enterprise needs to raise significant amounts 
of capital to establish itself, the for-profit model offers little help due to the 
shareholder primacy model and government restrictions on donations to 
outside charities, whether affiliated or not. However, when social 
enterprises can raise capital through private seed money and without 
relying on loans and equity markets, for-profit corporations and social 
enterprise can be a successful combination. One prominent example is 
Newman’s Own, a for-profit corporation which sells food products at a 
profit and then donates the entirety of the after-tax profits to charity.72 
Since its launch in 1982, the company has donated over $280 million to 
charity.73 However, this type of opportunity and success is rare; in most 
situations start-up social enterprises, like other businesses, require more 
funding than they can provide themselves, and profits are needed to repay 
loans or entice shareholders to purchase equity. 
Recently, there have been attempts to steer more capital to social 
enterprises organized as for-profit companies through private certification. 
B Lab, a nonprofit corporation based in Pennsylvania, created the “B-
Corporation” designation (the “B” stands for beneficial) for which for-
profit social enterprises can apply.74 In order to be certified as a B-
Corporation, a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or LLC must 
receive a grade of at least 80 out of a possible 200 points on B Lab’s 
questionnaire focusing on the company’s social impact.75 
Once certified, the company must amend its bylaws or other operating 
agreement to ensure that managers and directors can consider 
constituencies other than just shareholders, including its employees, 
suppliers, consumers, community, and environment.76 However, if the 
company is a corporation, the company’s state of incorporation must have a 
“constituency statute” which allows the directors of corporations to 
 
 72. Funding Universe, Newman’s Own, Inc., http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/Newmans-Own-Inc-Company-History.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 73. Newman’s Own, Our Story, http://www.newmansown.com/ourstory.aspx (last visited Nov. 
15, 2009). 
 74. B Corporation, FAQ, http://www.bcorporation.net/faq (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 75. B Corporation, Becoming a B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net/become (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2009). 
 76. B Corporation, Term Sheet for Class of 2009 B Corporations, http://www.bcorporation.net/ 
resources/bcorp/documents/BCorp_TermSheet_Declaration_ConstituencyState_20091.pdf. 
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consider groups other than shareholders. Currently thirty-one states have 
constituency statutes,77 but Delaware, the state in which more than half of 
the publicly traded companies in the United States are incorporated,78 
notably, does not. It appears that the directors’ contractual duties to outside 
constituencies mandated by B Lab are incompatible with Delaware’s 
conception of fiduciary duties.79 If a corporation wants to gain the B-
Corporation label and it is incorporated in a state without a constituency 
statue, it has to reincorporate in a state that does have a constituency 
statute, or risk facing a derivative suit. 
As of this point, the B-Corporation has yet to gain much momentum, 
as only 220 companies have obtained the certification.80 Some of the 
difficulty could be due to the fact that the benefits of B-Corporation status 
are uncertain, while there are certain definite costs. For instance, certified 
B-Corporations must agree to provide specified percentages of their income 
every year to B Lab,81 but it is not certain that the label will help to raise 
capital. 
III. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN EUROPE 
For over a decade, European efforts to spur the growth of social 
enterprise have included policies aimed at the creation of hybrid entities. 
The policies regarding these entities have generally reflected the European 
understanding of social enterprise as a tool for decreasing unemployment, 
an idea which is also evident in the European Union’s hopes for the 
sector.82 The European Commission estimates that there are close to 2 
 
 77. Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-
Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 271, 290 n.273 (2009). 
 78. Delaware Department of State, Division of Corporations, About Agency, http:// 
www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 79. See Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in 
Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 789, 795 (2008) (arguing that B-Corporations are currently incompatible with Delaware 
corporate law). 
 80. B Corporation, B Community, http://www.bcorporation.net/community (last visited Feb. 10, 
2010). Seventh Generation, manufacturer of non-toxic cleaners and personal care products, is one 
notable B corporation. B Corporation, Seventh Generation, http://www.bcorporation.net/ 
seventhgeneration (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). King Arthur Flour is another. B Corporation, King 
Arthur Flour, http://www.bcorporation.net/kingarthurflour (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 81. B Corporation, Make It Official, http://www.bcorporation.net/index.cfm/nodeID/3C192853-
ADFD-4C10-B5F3-3D9654551A98/fuseaction/content.page (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 82. The Commission of the European Communities recommends creating policies to facilitate the 
growth of entrepreneurship, including social entrepreneurship, as a method for strengthening the overall 
European Economy. Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, 
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million social enterprises currently operating in Europe, which comprises 
roughly 10% of all European companies.83 The Commission further 
estimates that these businesses employ 11 million people in Europe,84 
although the different definitions of social enterprise make it difficult to 
gather precise numbers.85 
Recognizing that most social enterprises, at least at their inception, are 
small or medium sized enterprises (“SMEs”),86 the European Commission 
is attempting to spur the creation of social enterprises as part of its efforts 
to develop the SME sector as a whole.87 The Commission recommends that 
European Union member-states implement policies that incentivize citizens 
to create SMEs in hopes of closing the productivity gap between the 
European Union and the United States.88 The Commission suggests that the 
creation of SMEs leads to increased economic diversity, which in turn 
promotes greater economic growth potential.89 This hypothesis rests, in 
part, on economist Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of “creative destruction,” 
the idea that the entry and exit of businesses in the market allows for 
continuous reallocation of resources to their best use.90 The Commission 
suggests that member states provide business support to entrepreneurs and 
create policies that allow for the easy creation of businesses.91 Belgium and 
the United Kingdom have followed these recommendations and enacted 
legislation intended to encourage the growth of social enterprise within 
their borders. 
In this section I discuss the polices which Belgium and the United 
Kingdom have adopted in order to promote the growth of social enterprise. 
 
The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: The 
European Agenda for Entrepreneurship, COM (2004) 70 final (Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter European 
Agenda for Entrepreneurship]. See also Rafael Chaves Ávila & José Luis Monzón Campos, The Social 
Economy of the European Union, 7-8, delivered to the European Economic and Social Committee, 
CESE/COMM/05/2005 (2005). 
 83. European Commission, Enterprise and Industry: Social Economy, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enterprise/entrepreneurship/craft/social_economy/soc-eco_intro_en.htm. 
 84. Id. 
 85. KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, supra note 20, at 13. 
 86. An SME is a company with fewer than 250 employees. Commission Recommendation (EC) 
No.2003/361 of 6 May 2003, Annex, art. 2(1), 2003 O.J. (L124) 36, 39. 
 87. See European Agenda for Entrepreneurship, supra note 82, at 3. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Communication from the Commission, to the Council, The European Parliament, The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Think Small First”: A 
“Small Business Act” for Europe, Impact Assessment, at 2, COM (2008) 394 final (June 25, 2008). 
 90. See id. at 7 (advocating member states to ensure fast bankruptcy proceedings). 
 91. European Agenda for Entrepreneurship, supra note 82, at 6. 
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Both countries have created unique business forms that cater to the needs 
of social-enterprise organizations. However, the policies in the United 
Kingdom have proven more successful because of their focus on generating 
greater public understanding of social enterprise and creating new sources 
of capital for social-enterprise organizations. The policies in Belgium have 
been more limited in their success mainly because the business form 
tailored to social-enterprise organizations does not provide new capital 
streams to the organizations. 
A. Belgium 
Belgium was one of the first European countries to implement policies 
aimed at actively supporting social enterprise. However, their policies have 
had only limited success so far. The Belgian government officially defined 
social enterprise as a company with “a purpose of serving members of the 
community rather than seeking profit, an independent management, a 
democratic decision-making process, and the primacy of people and labor 
over capital in the distribution of income.”92 Despite this national 
definition, the governments of Belgium’s three regions use their own 
definitions when gathering statistics on social enterprise.93 This results in 
imprecise data which has hindered the study and development of the 
sector.94 
The global economic downturn in the 1970s led to an increase in 
structural unemployment in Belgium.95 In response, many Belgians started 
charity organizations focused on job reintegration in Belgium during the 
1980s and early 1990s.96 These groups were typically organized as 
nonprofit entities known as Associations sans but Lucratifs (“ASBLs”). 
ASBLs are similar to American nonprofit corporations, especially in that 
they can carry out only limited commercial activity and are able to apply 
for government subsidies. The limitations on commercial activity hinder 
their effectiveness as vehicles for social enterprise. 
In 1995, the Belgian government made its first attempt at encouraging 
this type of social-enterprise activity when the parliament approved a law 
creating a new corporate form called the Société à Finalité Sociale 
 
93 Defourney, supra note 18, at 11. 
 93. KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, supra note 21, at 13. 
 94. COUNTRY FICHE - BELGIUM, supra note 20, at 2-3. 
 95. Belgian Section of CIRIEC, The Social Economy of Integration, Analysis of the 
Complementarities and Efficiency of the Tools of the Social Economy, at 3-4, N SO/H6/049 (2005). 
 96. Id. 
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(“SFS”).97 The purpose of the SFS is to provide a business format for social 
enterprises that allows for more commercial activity than ASBLs. 
However, in action, the SFS is more like the certification system of the B-
Corporation, acting as a label rather than a new business entity.98 To 
become an SFS, a company must include in its articles that the members of 
the company are seeking limited or no profit, and that any profit 
distributions cannot exceed an annual return of 6% on the investor’s 
principal.99 Additionally, when the company is dissolved, any assets 
remaining after liabilities are repaid and investors’ capital is returned must 
be reinvested in a company or charity which furthers the SFS’s social 
purpose.100 The SFS essentially operates as a for-profit company that has 
additional restrictions on profit distribution. Despite these restrictions the 
SFS does not offer any advantages for raising capital, compared to a 
regular for-profit company, other than the potential branding value of being 
recognized as a social enterprise. 
Due to the lack of clear advantages of the SFS, many social 
entrepreneurs have chosen to either forgo the full realization of the 
commercial aspects of their social enterprises and instead form ASBLs or 
simply to form for-profit companies without the distribution restrictions. 
As a result, few Belgian entrepreneurs are choosing to use the SFS form. 
Between its creation in 1995 and 2003, only 400 SFSs registered with the 
Belgian government,101 and the form has not received much popular 
support.102 The disadvantages of the SFS, as compared to the ASBL and 
for-profit companies, have limited the development of the social-enterprise 
sector in Belgium, as social enterprises have not embraced the SFS and 
remain generally confined to the traditional forms. 
B. The United Kingdom 
While Belgium has struggled to facilitate the development of social 
enterprise, the United Kingdom has developed the most robust social-
enterprise sector in the European Union.103 The British government 
 
 97. Jacques Defourney & Marthe Nyssen, Belgium: Social Enterprises in Community Services, in 
THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 47. 
 98. Marthe Nyssens, Belgium, in SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN EUROPE: RECENT TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 13, 13 (Jacques Defourney et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that the SFS is really just a label) 
[hereinafter Belgium, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN EUROPE]. 
 99. Id. at 61 n.3. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 13. 
 102. Id. at 7. 
 103. KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, supra note 20, at 12. 
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endorses the view that social enterprises are a useful tool for closing the 
productivity gap with the United States104 and has been creating a network 
of resources for this purpose. The government established the Social 
Enterprise Unit with its own junior minister in 2001 to identify barriers to 
the growth of the social-enterprise sector in the United Kingdom and to 
develop strategies to overcome these obstacles.105 The Unit officially 
defined “social enterprise” for the U.K. government in its first report one 
year later as “a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses 
are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the 
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for 
shareholders and owners.”106 
This report also identified four primary areas where the government 
can help to develop the social-enterprise sector: (1) foster a culture where 
there is full information about the potential of social enterprise, (2) ensure 
advice and information is available for those running social enterprises, (3) 
ensure there is access to finance for social enterprise, and (4) ensure that 
social enterprises can do business with the public sector and work with the 
government to achieve shared objectives.107 These findings not only 
reflected the belief that there was a profound lack of information available 
to the public about social enterprise,108 but also that the government was 
transitioning from providing wholly government-sponsored public services 
to forming public-private partnerships to achieve the same goals.109 
The government quickly moved to implement policies in the four 
target areas. To help the flow of information and support for social 
enterprise, the Social Enterprise Unit created a website dedicated to social 
enterprise and opened regional social-enterprise development centers. The 
Unit then selected 35 social-enterprise ambassadors to help spread 
 
 104. CABINET OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE THIRD SECTOR, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ACTION PLAN: 
SCALING NEW HEIGHTS 17 (2006) [hereinafter SCALING NEW HEIGHTS], available at http:// 
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/third_sector/assets/se_action_plan_2006.pdf. 
 105. KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, supra note 20, at 43. 
 106. SCALING NEW HEIGHTS, supra note 104, at 10. 
 107. Id. at 19-20. 
 108. See CABINET OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE THIRD SECTOR, PRIVATE ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT: A 
REVIEW OF CHARITIES AND THE WIDER NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR 57 (2002), available at http:// 
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/strat%20data.pdf [hereinafter PRIVATE 
ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT]. 
 109. ALEX NICHOLLS & CATHY PHAROAH, THE LANDSCAPE OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT: A HOLISTIC 
TOPOLOGY OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 21 (2008), available at http:// 
www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.31110/08.pdf. For an example of public-private 
partnership opportunities in the United Kingdom, see DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT: A TOOLKIT FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISES 13 (2003). 
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information within local communities.110 The government also established 
a ₤10 million fund for investment in social enterprises111 and started a 
program to develop better metrics for measuring the social impact of these 
enterprises.112 
Additionally, the government investigated the adequacy of the legal 
entities available to social enterprises in the United Kingdom. Before 2004, 
the options in the United Kingdom were similar to those available in the 
United States: limited companies and charities. The U.K. government 
supports charities with a system similar to the charitable income tax 
deduction in the United States, although there are some subtle differences. 
In the United Kingdom, individuals give money to charities with after-tax 
dollars, and the charity receives from the government an amount equal to 
the bottom-tax-bracket tax paid on the donation by the individual and an 
additional three pence per pound credit. The bottom tax rate is currently 
20%, so for a ₤100 after-tax donation paid by the individual, the charity 
gets an extra ₤28 from the government.113 Individuals who are in the higher 
40% bracket are able to reclaim the difference between the tax they paid on 
the income used for the donation and the amount the charity received from 
the government.114 
Charities are also able to engage in a limited amount of commercial 
activity, but only if it directly furthers the charity’s charitable purpose 
beyond simply raising funds for the charity.115 If a charity wants to have 
more than an insubstantial amount of commercial activity, it is required to 
set up a separate limited company called a “trading company,” which can 
then donate money from its profits to the charity.116 The trading company 
can donate pre-tax money from its profits, but cannot give beyond its 
surplus and the distribution cannot be in the form of a dividend.117 This 
requirement of a separate entity insulates the charity from losses sustained 
 
 110. CABINET OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE THIRD SECTOR, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ACTION PLAN: ONE 
YEAR ON 2 (2007), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/third_sector/ 
assets/social_enterprise_action_plan_one_year_on.pdf [hereinafter ONE YEAR ON]. 
 111. SCALING NEW HEIGHTS, supra note 104, at 5. 
 112. Id. at 42. 
 113. Directgov, Information for Giving, http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/ 
ManagingMoney/GivingMoneyToCharity/DG_10015097 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 114. Id. 
 115. PRIVATE ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT, supra note 108, at 44. 
 116. Id. 
 117. HM Revenue and Customs, Gifts to Charity Made by Companies, http:// 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/businesses/giving/companies.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). In other words, this 
restriction protects charities from the potential losses that regular shareholders might be exposed to. 
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by the trading company, but also adds a significant amount of 
administrative cost and difficulty for social enterprises as they need to 
adhere to the regulatory requirements of two distinct enterprises.118 
Despite the added difficulty, one-third of charities in the United 
Kingdom received income from commercial activities in 2002.119 
Recognizing this trend, as well as the limitations on hybrid activity inherent 
in the for-profit and charity forms, the Social Enterprise Unit recommended 
to Parliament that the government create a new business entity geared 
towards the needs of social enterprise.120 In 2004, the government followed 
through and established the Community Interest Company (“CIC”) as part 
of the 2004 Companies Act.121 
The CIC is similar to a limited company, but has restrictions 
guaranteeing that the company will serve a social interest. A CIC may be a 
company limited by guarantee, where all profits are reinvested in the 
enterprise, or a company limited by shares, where the company can raise 
equity and issue limited dividends to its shareholders.122 The dividends are 
restricted by a per share return cap of “5% above the Bank of England base 
lending rate” as well as an aggregate limit of 35% of total company 
profits;123 generally the aggregate cap is the more limiting of the two 
restrictions.124 
The government created two mechanisms to ensure that the CIC 
succeeds. First, as part of the 2004 Companies Act, the government created 
the CIC Regulator to register and monitor compliance with CIC 
regulations. The CIC Regulator’s role is only to be that of a “light-touch 
regulator” that monitors but does not engage in proactive scrutiny of 
 
 118. Costs arise from having to follow two distinct regulatory schemes. Additionally, there is the 
incentive for charity trustees to heavily invest in regulatory compliance costs, because trustees can be 
personally liable for any harm to the charity resulting from an improperly administered relationship 
between the charity and a trading company. See Charity Commission, How Charities May Lawfully 
Trade, http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/publications/cc35.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 119. PRIVATE ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT, supra note 108, at 43. 
 120. Id. at 53. 
 121. The Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c.27. 
 122. THE REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COS., INCORPORATING A NEW COMMUNITY INTEREST 
COMPANY 21 (2008), available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidanceindex.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2009) [hereinafter INCORPORATING A NEW CIC]. 
 123. REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COS., COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTION 11 (2009), available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/CICleaflets/FAQ%20-
%20October%202009%20V5.00%20Final.pdf [hereinafter FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION]. 
 124. FRASER VALLEY CENTRE FOR SOC. ENTER., ANALYSIS OF L3C AND CIC SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
MODELS 5 (2008), available at http://www.centreforsocialenterprise.com/f/L3C_and_ 
CIC_social_enterprise_models_Oct_2008.doc. 
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CICs.125 However, if the Regulator discovers a major problem, he or she 
has the authority to appoint or remove directors and managers and also take 
steps to protect the CIC’s property.126 In addition, each CIC must pass the 
“Community Benefit Test,”127 and annually submit a public report 
confirming that the Test is being met.128 The basic test is whether “a 
reasonable person might consider that [the CIC’s] activities are being 
carried on for the benefit of the community.”129 This test is generally not 
satisfied if the CIC aims to benefit a small number of people or if it intends 
to support a particular political party.130 It is important to note that the 
community receiving the benefit need not be located within the United 
Kingdom, opening the possibility that the CIC could be a tool for social 
enterprise worldwide.131 To ensure that money invested in a CIC reaches 
the community if the CIC is dissolved, there is an “asset-lock.” The asset-
lock mandates that after liabilities have been repaid and investors have 
received their principal, investments, all remaining assets must be 
transferred to another CIC, a charity, or a foreign equivalent to a charity 
upon dissolution.132 
The primary benefit of the CIC is that it allows enterprises, which 
otherwise may have operated as charities, to engage in an unrestricted 
amount of commercial activity, so long as the enterprise provides a 
community benefit. However, at this point CICs do not receive the tax 
advantages which charities receive; instead, they are subject to income and 
value-added taxes like other companies in the United Kingdom.133 To 
accommodate for this loss of a potential revenue steam, CICs can seek 
funding from the government’s social enterprise investment fund134 and 
 
 125. INCORPORATING A NEW CIC, supra note 122, at 28. 
 126. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 123, at 4. 
 127. INCORPORATING A NEW CIC, supra note 122, at 26. 
 128. REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COS., INFORMATION PACK: COMMUNITY INTEREST 
COMPANIES, 37, available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/CICleaflets/CIC%20INFORMATION% 
20PACK%20V00.02D.pdf [hereinafter INFORMATION PACK]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Robert Wexler, Social Enterprise: A Legal Context, 54 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 233, 244 
(2006). 
 132. INCORPORATING A NEW CIC, supra note 123, at 26. 
 133. INFORMATION PACK, supra note 128, at 27. 
 134. The U.K. government is still determining how best to distribute these funds. CABINET OFFICE, 
OFFICE OF THE THIRD SECTOR, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ACTION PLAN: TWO YEARS ON 5 (2008), available 
at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/84387/seap_two_years_on.pdf [hereinafter TWO YEARS ON]. 
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from the national lottery fund.135 There is no explicit wording in U.K. 
charity laws allowing foundations to support CICs, but foundations can 
request permission to do so from the U.K. Charity Commission. At least 
one private foundation in the United Kingdom has applied for, and 
received, permission to fund CICs.136 Additionally, the Social Enterprise 
Unit is considering a proposal to use money recovered from dormant bank 
accounts to help fund CICs137 and social-enterprise groups are lobbying for 
special tax advantages for CICs to further facilitate raising capital for social 
enterprise.138 
The CIC has played a key role in the United Kingdom’s development 
of its social-enterprise sector, proving more popular than initial government 
projections had anticipated. There were 360 CICs registered in the form’s 
first year of existence,139 over 1,000 in the first two years,140 and now, 
nearly five years after the CIC form was created, there are over 3,000 
CICs.141 The increase in CICs has occurred alongside a dramatic increase in 
the general awareness of the social-enterprise sector in the United 
Kingdom. Two years after the creation of the first CIC, 12% more people 
in the United Kingdom were aware of the concept of social enterprise as 
compared to the number of people who were aware of the concept before 
CICs existed.142 Additionally, many people believe that the full potential of 
CICs to expand the social economy has yet to be realized. Some financial 
analysts believe that the transparency required by the CIC regulations 
provides a great opportunity for the development of viable secondary 
markets for shares of the companies.143 The government’s investment in 
developing better metrics for social valuation only enhances this 
possibility. 
 
 135. Malcolm Lynch, For and Against the Community Interest Company, INVESTMENT MATTERS, 
Jan. 2004, at 1, 4. 
 136. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 123, at 7. 
 137. ONE YEAR ON, supra note 110, at 4. 
 138. Social Enterprise Coalition, Policy: Tax, http://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/pages/tax.html 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 139. FRASER VALLEY CENTRE FOR SOC. ENTER., supra note 124, at 4. 
 140. Jacques Defourny & Marthe Nyssens, Social Enterprise in Europe: Introduction to an Update, 
in SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN EUROPE: RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENT 4, 6 (Jacques Defourney et al. 
eds., 2008). 
 141. As of January 8, 2010, there are 3322 registered CICs. The Regulator of Community Interest 
Companies, List of Community Interest Companies, http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/coSearch/ 
companyList.shtml (last visited Jan. 8, 2010). 
 142. See TWO YEARS ON, supra note 134, at 2. 
 143. Matrix Group Discussion Paper, supra note 65, at 21. 
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The prospects for the CIC seem bright, but some entrepreneurs believe 
that the form is too restrictive. As a case in point, the ECT Group was one 
of the early CIC success stories. The company, which provided a panoply 
of services to local communities, including street cleaning, recycling, and 
local public transportation,144 grew to be the country’s largest CIC and was 
featured prominently in the Social Enterprise Unit’s first two annual reports 
in 2006 and 2007.145 However, the dividend restrictions imposed on CICs 
made it difficult for the company to raise capital through equity markets. 
As a result, the ECT Group took on significant debt as it grew; by 2008 its 
credit lines had run dry and the company was forced to sell off nearly all its 
lines of business to companies in the private sector.146 The sales raised 
concerns in the social-enterprise community that these types of forced sales 
could stifle the sector’s development. Needless to say, the ECT Group was 
not included in the Social Enterprise Unit’s third annual report.147 
It remains to be seen whether the dividend restrictions will 
prohibitively limit CICs’ access to capital, or whether creative social 
valuation metrics can nurture an active social-equity market. However, the 
rapid pace at which entrepreneurs continue to register CICs shows hope, at 
least, for the latter. Creating laws explicitly allowing private foundations to 
support CICs and initiating tax advantages for CICs would certainly 
increase this likelihood, but these developments will largely rest on the 
political climate within the United Kingdom. Regardless, the CIC appears 
to be fostering enthusiasm in social enterprise and is helping to provide 
much needed revenue streams for social services in the United Kingdom. 
IV. THE U.S. RESPONSE TO SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
Many of the obstacles to social enterprise in the United States stem 
from the same problems that existed in the United Kingdom prior to the 
creation of the CIC and that still exist in Belgium: difficulty raising capital 
and the lack of an appropriate legal form. The for-profit form and the 
nonprofit form have their advantages and their disadvantages, but neither 
are a good fit for the needs of social enterprise. Recognizing the growing 
interest in social enterprise, several U.S. states have created a hybrid entity, 
the L3C, in an attempt to create a workable solution for social enterprise. 
 
 144. SCALING NEW HEIGHTS, supra note 106, at 22. 
 145. Id.; ONE YEAR ON, supra note 110, at cover. 
 146. Helen Warrell, News Analysis: What's the Price of Social Enterprise?, THIRD SECTOR, July 2, 
2008, available at http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/News/Article/828078/News-analysis-Whats-price-
social-enterprise/. 
 147. TWO YEARS ON, supra note 134. 
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The L3C is a specific type of Limited Liability Company (“LLC”). 
Like other LLCs, it generally limits owners’ liability to their investment 
and can operate much like a partnership or corporation through the use of 
contracts. Importantly, the L3C, like the LLC, allows the company to issue 
equity to raise capital. The crucial difference between the L3C and the LLC 
(and for-profit corporations) is that the format is designed to make it easy 
for L3Cs to receive Program Related Investments (“PRIs”) from 
foundations. This creates the possibility of raising a significant amount of 
capital for social enterprises. 
In this section I discuss the potential value of PRIs to social-enterprise 
organizations and the obstacles currently limiting their use. I then discuss 
how the L3C form was designed to resolve these obstacles, but how this 
potential has yet to be realized due to continued ambiguities from the IRS. 
A. Program Related Investments 
There are more than 75,000 grant-making foundations in the United 
States.148 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is by far the largest, with 
nearly $40 billion in assets, while the second largest, the Ford Foundation, 
has assets of nearly $14 billion.149 Foundations provide a significant 
amount of funding to charitable causes and represent a significant 
opportunity for social enterprise to gain access to investment capital. Tax 
law requires charitable foundations in the United States to distribute at least 
5% of their assets each year.150 However, foundations generally treat this 
minimum level as a target level for giving.151 In 2003, this resulted in 
distributions of nearly $30 billion, roughly 12% of the overall charitable 
donations in the United States;152 distributions increased to an estimated 
$45 billion in 2008.153 
 
 148. FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GROWTH AND GIVING ESTIMATES: CURRENT OUTLOOK 1, 1 
(2009). 
 149. Id. at 11. 
 150. If a foundation does not fulfill the 5% distribution requirement, the foundation can be liable 
for a 100% tax on the undistributed amount. 26 U.S.C. § 4942 (2007). 
 151. A survey conducted in 2001 by the Foundation Center of 55,120 private foundations found 
that the private foundations gave out an average of 5.8% of their assets. Jed Emerson, Where Money 
Meets Mission, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 38, 40-41 (2003). 
 152. Sally Osberg, Wayfinding Without a Compass: Philanthropy’s Changing Landscape and Its 
Implications for Social Entrepreneurs, in SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: NEW MODELS OF SUSTAINABLE 
SOCIAL CHANGE 309, 310 (Alex Nichols ed., 2006). 
 153. FOUND. CTR., supra note 148, at 4. 
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Foundation distributions are primarily in the form of grants or 
donations;154 however the IRS also allows foundations to make PRIs which 
count towards the 5% requirement.155 PRIs let foundations make 
investments to accomplish an exempt purpose.156 Production of income 
cannot be a significant purpose of the investment,157 but under certain 
circumstances, investments in for-profit businesses can count as PRIs.158 
Any income received from the investment in PRIs is essentially “off the 
books”—in other words, not counted as profit—for the foundation, but it 
must be reinvested within the same year the foundation receives the 
investment income.159 
The concept of investments to achieve social, rather than income-
generating, goals has existed in the United States for centuries. Perhaps the 
earliest “PRI” was when Ben Franklin left ₤2000 in his will to be used as a 
revolving loan base for young artists.160 PRIs, however, were not 
institutionalized until the 1960s. The Ford Foundation pioneered the use of 
PRIs in 1968 when it committed $10 million for investments in socially 
beneficial companies rather than simply the traditional grants to 
charities.161 Congress quickly followed by adding PRIs to the list of 
acceptable disbursements of foundation assets in the Tax Reform Act of 
1969.162 Since that point, the Ford Foundation has committed $400 million 
in PRIs.163 
Unfortunately, it can be difficult for foundations to determine when 
they can make acceptable PRIs with companies achieving an exempt 
purpose and producing a profit. The treasury regulations offer some 
examples of acceptable PRIs, but many are outdated and unhelpful.164 
 
 154. Julia Vail, Program-Related Investments Provide Needed Relief, PHILANTHROPY J., Mar. 
2009, (2009), available at http://www.philanthropyjournal.org/resources/special-reports/finance-
accounting/program-related-investments-provide-needed-relief. 
 155. I.R.C. § 4944 (2007). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199-943-044 (1999). 
 159. Matrix Group Discussion Paper, supra note 65, at 20. 
 160. FORD FOUND., INVESTING FOR SOCIAL GAIN: REFLECTIONS ON TWO DECADES OF PROGRAM-
RELATED INVESTMENTS 12 (1991). 
 161. Id. at 5. 
 162. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 4942(g)(2), 83 Stat. 487, 505 (1969). 
 163. Ford Foundation, About Our Support, http://www.fordfound.org/grants/supporttypes (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 164. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1 (2009) (stating, among other examples, that loans to or 
investment in a “a small business enterprise located in a deteriorated urban area and owned by members 
of an economically disadvantaged minority group” can qualify as a PRIs). 
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Historically, foundations that want to make a PRI have had two options for 
evaluating whether their proposed investment qualifies. One option is to 
request a Private Letter Ruling (“PLR”) from the IRS. Under this option, 
the foundation carefully describes the proposed investment and its potential 
uses and the IRS responds with a decision on whether the investment 
qualifies.165 Acceptable PRIs have included investment in an LLC which 
facilitated economic development in disadvantaged communities166 and 
investment in a private company developing low-cost solutions to 
eradicating diseases affecting the developing world.167 The IRS’s decision 
is binding only as to the foundation which submits the PLR request and 
may not be used as precedent by other foundations.168 Obtaining a PLR 
gives the foundation a certain degree of security; however, it is a lengthy 
and expensive process. The IRS charges $8,700 for a PLR169 and the 
accompanying attorney fees can range from $25,000 to $50,000.170 
Furthermore, the foundation may be required to ensure that the investment 
is used by the company to further the exempt purpose and the IRS can 
require annual reports confirming this.171 
Alternatively, foundations can choose to make PRIs without obtaining 
a PLR, but the foundations run the risk of the investments not qualifying as 
a PRIs and being labeled as a “jeopardizing investments.” A jeopardizing 
investment is an investment which does not further an exempt purpose and 
is also not a prudent economic investment, such as if it is expected to 
produce below-market returns.172 If the IRS determines that an investment 
is a jeopardizing investment and not a qualifying PRI, the foundation and 
its managers can be liable for punitive excise taxes on the value of the 
investment.173 If it is determined that the investment does not further an 
 
 165. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-610-020 (Dec. 13, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-603-031 
(Oct. 25, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-41-025 (July 20, 1981). 
 166. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-610-020 (Dec. 13, 2005). 
 167. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-603-031 (Oct. 25, 2005). 
 168. I.R.S., Understanding IRS Guidance - A Brief Primer, http://www.irs.gov/ 
irs/article/0,,id=101102,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 169. ROBERT M. LANG, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, OVERVIEW OF THE L3C 2-3. 
 170. THE MARY ELIZABETH & GORDON B. MANNWEILER FOUND., INC., PRESENTATION, 
WORKSHOP 3-C, UBS PHILANTHROPY FORUM – JULY 5-7, 2007, LISBON, PORTUGAL 2 (2007), available 
at http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/supportingdownloads/L3CUBSPresentation 
.pdf. 
 171. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-41-025 (July 20, 1981). 
 172. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1 (2007). 
 173. The foundation faces an initial 10% tax on the value of a jeopardizing investment. Any 
foundation manager who knowingly makes a jeopardizing investment must also pay a 10% tax on the 
value of the investment. Additionally, foundations and knowing foundation managers are liable for 25% 
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exempt purpose but is not a jeopardizing investment, the foundation will 
not be responsible for any taxes, but the investment will not count towards 
the foundation’s 5% required disbursements.174 
B. The L3C: A Tool to Remove the Uncertainty of PRIs 
Due to the difficulty in determining what qualifies as a PRI, 
foundations have not made use of PRIs on a large scale. PRIs have yet to 
represent even 1% of the total amount of disbursements from 
foundations.175 The primary purpose of the L3C is to make it easier and less 
costly for foundations to determine where they can safely invest with PRIs, 
thereby increasing the amount of capital available for social enterprise. By 
statute, each L3C must create an operating agreement which contractually 
binds the company to operate primarily for an exempt purpose.176 If a 
company ceases to operate primarily for an exempt purpose, it will 
statutorily cease to be an L3C and foundations will know not to invest PRIs 
with the company.177 
The potential value of PRIs to L3Cs is much larger than just the PRIs 
themselves. The hope is that the PRIs will allow L3Cs the opportunity to 
access funds through traditional capital markets through a process called 
“layered investing.”178 The idea behind layered investing is that foundation 
will use PRIs to invest in the L3C at a below-market rate of return; because 
the investments cannot be made with the primary purpose of generating 
income, this is not a problem. This low-return investment will allow the 
L3C to contribute a larger share of profits towards market-oriented 
investors, thereby raising their potential economic return.179 This scheme 
allows L3Cs that have lower than market-rate profit potential, due to the 
 
and 5% excise taxes, respectively, on the value of the jeopardizing investment in each subsequent year 
in which the investment remains in effect. I.R.C. § 4944 (2009). 
 174. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-213-038 (Apr. 23, 2001). 
 175. In 2001, there was a total of $232.9 million in PRIs and total charitable giving was $30.5 
billion. Michael D. Gottesman, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road Forward for the 
Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 350 (citing JEFFREY A. 
FALKENSTEIN, THE FOUNDATION CENTER, THE PRI DIRECTORY: CHARITABLE LOANS AND OTHER 
PROGRAM-RELATED INVESTMENTS BY FOUNDATIONS (2003)). In 2006, there was a total of $310.5 
million in PRIs. Vail, supra note 154. In 2008 total charitable giving was $45.6 billion. FOUND. CTR., 
supra note 148. 
 176. See, e.g., H.B. 775, 2007-2008 Vt. Adjourned Sess. (Vt. 2008). 
 177. See id. 
 178. See AMERICANS FOR CMTY. DEV., THE L3C: INTRODUCING THE NEW SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 11 (2008), http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/ 
supportingdownloads/Introducing_the_L3C.ppt (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 179. Id. at 14. 
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costs of serving the enterprise’s exempt purpose, to pad their expected rates 
of return and raise money through traditional capital markets. 
In April 2008, Vermont became the first state to adopt an L3C 
statute.180 An L3C is not required to do business in the state where it is 
registered. It is a recognized entity able to do business in any state or 
abroad as well. Since Vermont passed the L3C bill, five other states have 
adopted L3C statutes181 and seven additional states have bills at various 
stages in the legislature.182 The creation of the L3C has been well-received 
by foundations. After the passing of the L3C bill in Michigan, Rob Collier, 
president of the Council of Michigan Foundations, said that “a number of 
foundations have said that they felt this was a good tool for [them] to add to 
the toolbox,”183 and the president of Michigan foundation Husdon-Webber 
simply said, “This is big.”184 
The L3C can be a vehicle for spurring the growth of new 
entrepreneurial social enterprises, but may also help some traditional 
industries which serve the community. Robert Lang, CEO of the 
Mannweiler Foundation and one of the initial proponents of the L3C,185 
envisions that the L3C form could be a way to save the struggling 
newspaper industry.186 So far the idea has been discussed by at least two 
newspapers, but it is yet to be seen if the L3C will be adopted by either.187 
Additionally, for-profit companies are playing an increasing role in the 
 
 180. H.B. 775, 2007-2008 Vt. Adjourned Sess. (Vt. 2008). 
 181. S.B. 239, 96th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2009); S.B. 1445, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009); H.B. 
1545, 61st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2009); S.B.148 (Utah 2009); H.B. 182, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(Wyo. 2009). 
 182. H.B. 2102, 87th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); L.D. 1265, 124th Leg. (Me. 2009); 
H.B. 817, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.B. 235, Leg., 61st Sess. (Mont. 2009); S.B. 308, 
2009 Gen. Assem., Sess. (N.C. 2009); H.B. 2886, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S.B. 472, 
106th Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2009). 
 183. Sherri Begin Welch, Foundation for Investment; Nonprofits Can Fund Business Efforts, 
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., Feb. 23, 2009, at 3. 
 184. Id. at 2. 
 185. HEATHER PEELER, CMTY. WEALTH VANGUARD, THE L3C: A NEW TOOL FOR SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISE, http://www.communitywealth.com/Newsletter/August%202007/L3C.html (2007). 
 186. Mark Fitzgerald, Prophet Motives: What Can Be Done?, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, Apr. 2009, 
at 28. 
 187. The L3C was discussed as an option for the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE. James Temple, 
Plans for Chronicle Floated, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2009, at C1. The L3C was also discussed as an 
option for the PEORIA JOURNAL STAR. Bill Richards, The Peoria Plan for Saving Local Dailies, 
CROSSCUT, Jan. 27, 2009, http://crosscut.com/2009/01/27/seattle-newspapers/18808/ (last visited Dec. 
3, 2009). 
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healthcare188 and education189 industries, and the L3C could be a viable 
option in both of these fields as well. 
Despite the fact that L3C statutes require that L3Cs operate in 
accordance with IRS standards for organizations that can receive PRIs,190 
the IRS has not issued an official statement that it will automatically allow 
investments in L3Cs to count as PRIs. Without this assurance many 
foundations are still hesitant to use PRIs with L3Cs because of the potential 
of having the investments labeled as jeopardizing investments. 
Furthermore, without additional programs in place to publicize and support 
the development of social enterprise, the branding-value of the L3C as a 
social-enterprise label will not reach its full potential. 
V. LESSONS FROM BELGIUM AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
If the United States is committed to developing its domestic social-
enterprise sector, policy-makers need to learn from the divergent 
experiences of Belgium and the United Kingdom. It is also necessary for 
the United States to take a renewed and pragmatic look at its approach to 
charity and the provision of social services. Social enterprise represents an 
opportunity to leverage significantly more private money into the provision 
of social services, a sector which has traditionally relied on charity and 
government funding, and also to increase efficiency in order to make this 
money go further than before. 
Looking at Europe, the two primary areas where government can be 
most effective in stimulating social enterprise are (1) increasing access to 
capital and (2) creating an environment where the public is aware of and 
receptive to the benefits of social enterprise. Increasing access to capital 
can come from making new pools of funding available to social-enterprise 
organizations such as the United Kingdom’s social-enterprise fund, or by 
fortifying current capital streams by providing government subsidies in the 
form of tax incentives, as has been suggested in the United Kingdom. 
Creating a fertile landscape for social enterprise can be achieved through 
policies such as embracing a uniform definition of social enterprise and 
investing in programs to quantify social returns. 
 
 188. Lisa M. Fairfax, Achieving the Double Bottom Line: A Framework for Corporations Seeking 
to Deliver Profits and Public Services, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 207 (2004). 
 189. William C. Symonds, Education: A New Push to Privatize, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 14, 2002, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_02/b3765689.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2009). 
 190. See, e.g., H.B. 775, 2007-2008 Vt. Adjourned Sess. (Vt. 2008). 
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From the experiences in Belgium and the United Kingdom, it is clear 
that if a new entity for social enterprise is going to be successful in 
increasing access to capital, it needs to offer social entrepreneurs financial 
benefits which outweigh any added restrictions. The SFS’s minute impact 
in Belgium suggests that a mere social label will not likely generate these 
needed benefits on its own. In the United Kingdom however, the social 
enterprise fund, among other things, succeeded in increasing access to 
capital. In the United States, the opportunity for L3Cs to receive foundation 
PRIs has the potential to generate the necessary benefits for social 
entrepreneurs. The PRIs operate like the United Kingdom’s social 
investment fund and lottery fund, making the L3C an excellent vehicle to 
increase access to capital for social enterprise. However, to ensure that 
these benefits are realized, steps need to be taken so that foundations are 
comfortable making PRIs to L3Cs. A blanket statement from the IRS 
would remove the often prohibitive costs of obtaining a PLR, but could 
create apprehension over the potential for abuse. In light of this, the 
Council of Foundations is currently advocating for federal legislation to 
create a streamlined system of fast-tracked reviews by the IRS where L3Cs 
could apply for certification to receive PRIs.191 
Another option to increase access to capital is to buttress existing 
capital streams through the creation of tax incentives for L3Cs. A proposal 
to this end was suggested in the Congressional debate over the recent 
stimulus bill.192 Ultimately the tax incentives were not included in the final 
bill and there would likely be significant political opposition to what could 
be seen as simply shifting funds to private businesses. However, this 
argument has two main flaws: (1) it discounts the potential of L3Cs to 
relieve some of the burden on the government to provide social services, 
and (2) it ignores the fact that the government often gives subsidies to 
private businesses with socially beneficial ends such as alternative energy 
producers, ethanol-producing farmers, and manufacturers of hybrid cars.193 
It is also essential that the government provide the necessary support 
for social enterprise to gain solid footing in society. One element of this 
support is helping to generate a broad, unified understanding of what social 
enterprise is. The lack of a universal definition of social enterprise stymied 
Belgium’s attempts to gather accurate data on the sector, while an official 
 
 191. COUNCIL OF FOUNDS., ISSUE PAPER: ALLOW FOUNDATIONS TO MAKE PROGRAM-RELATED 
INVESTMENTS TO L3CS (2009). 
 192. See Senator Chuck Grassley, Prepared Remarks on Charities and Governance, in SENATE 
COMM. NEWS RELEASE, (Mar. 10, 2009). 
 193. See Malani & Posner, supra note 53, at 2031. 
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and accepted definition has helped the United Kingdom build public 
acceptance and support. 
Another element of support the government can use to bolster the 
development of social enterprise is to aid in the branding and valuation of 
social enterprise. In the United Kingdom, the CIC’s Community Benefit 
Test and the distribution limits help to achieve this end by assuring the 
public that CICs are serving the community. The United States could put in 
place similar “light-touch” regulation either at the federal level, through 
IRS regulations and monitoring, or on a state-by-state basis, by 
transitioning the role of secretaries of state from registering L3Cs to also 
lightly monitoring their activities, or by creating state monitoring agencies. 
The idea of a “light-touch” regulator balances the need for some assurance 
of public benefit with the potentially high reporting and observing costs 
associated with in-depth monitoring. The increased regulation would 
necessarily create the need for additional government spending. However, 
the U.K. government envisions that CIC registration fees, although set at 
only ₤35,194 may eventually cover the costs of regulation;195 if the L3C 
becomes the dominant vehicle for social enterprise, it is possible its 
regulation could become self-sustainable, or at least partially subsidized. 
In addition, the government can aid the development of social 
enterprise by investing in the research and development of valuation 
metrics which more accurately account for the social impact of social 
enterprises. Currently, there are no universally accepted standards for 
measuring social return, nor is there much known about what type of social 
returns are important to investors.196 Better methods of valuing social 
return could help nurture the market for social investment, as people 
interested in investing and doing business with companies with a social 
purpose would have better guidance. Social-return value could also help 
social enterprises maintain higher prices for their services; a recent study 
found that nearly 80% of U.S. consumers are willing to pay 10% more for a 
product produced in a “socially and environmentally responsible way.”197 
 
 194. INFORMATION PACK, supra note 128, at 35. 
 195. DEP’T. OF TRADE & INDUS., COMPANIES (AUDIT, INVESTIGATIONS AND COMMUNITY 
ENTERPRISE) BILL: REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 91 (2004), http://www.berr.gov.uk/ 
files/file23027.pdf. 
 196. NICHOLLS & PHAROAH, supra note 109, at 16. 
 197. The actual figure is 79.2%. James E. Austin et al., Social Entrepreneurship: It Is for 
Corporations Too, in SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: NEW MODELS OF SUSTAINABLE CHANGE 169, 174 
(Alex Nichols ed., 2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the experiences in Belgium and the United Kingdom 
that if governments want to facilitate the growth of social enterprise, it is 
essential that they provide support and benefits for companies entering the 
sector. Prior to the creation of the L3C, social-enterprise organizations in 
the United States were constrained by the rigidities of the traditional 
nonprofit and for-profit forms which do not allow much room for hybrid 
activity. In Belgium, government attempts to spur the development of 
social enterprise has had only limited success because the SFS imposes 
added costs while only providing a minimal branding benefit. Conversely, 
government efforts to increase social-enterprise activity in the United 
Kingdom have been more successful. The CIC allows social-enterprise 
organizations to tap new sources of capital; and the government’s 
investment in publicizing the potential positive impact of the social-
enterprise sector has enhanced the CIC’s branding value. In the United 
States, the L3C could be an important piece of social-enterprise reform. 
However, the L3C’s value will only be realized if government policies 
stimulate capital flows to these organizations and build increased public 
awareness of the benefits the social-enterprise sector can provide. If the 
U.S. government learns from its European counterparts and develops these 
two pillars of social-enterprise policy, capital support and public 
awareness, the social-enterprise sector has the potential to leverage billions 
of dollars for community investment, and in the process, revitalize the 
provision of social services in the United States. 
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